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on record a few years ago—that any one knowing well his Latin grammar hardly need study English grammar at all—be in a way justified if we granted the assumption that the laws recording the usage of one language are applicable also to other tongues?

In conclusion: The treatment of the Germanic tenses in the same manner is open to even more serious objections, because all the tenses except the present and the preterite, though probably stimulated by the completer tense-system of the Latin, were developed in Germanic times, and passed through a number of changes, both in form and in function, which can be plainly traced in the literary monuments of the various Germanic dialects.

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### THE CLOSING OF THE SYMPOSIUM

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WILLIAM GARDNER HALE  
The University of Chicago

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I have been asked to close the discussion, basing my remarks upon the printed abstracts of the papers which followed mine. This I gladly do.

My prevailing feeling is one of satisfaction. Five years ago I spoke upon the same subject before a body of high-school teachers of English French, German, Greek, and Latin. At the end of my talk, not a voice was raised in support of my position, and many were raised against it. My experience in frequent conversations with individuals upon the same matter has been in general the same. After I had read a paper on the subject before the American Philological Association in 1909, the opposition in the discussion which followed was more vigorous than the support. I was prepared for the same results when I addressed the Modern Language Association of America in 1910, and again when I read before the Michigan Schoolmasters' Club the paper with which the present symposium opened. I have indicated in that paper the entirely different spirit in which the Modern Language Association appeared, in its subsequent action, to view the contentions put before it, and I find again an entirely different spirit in the discussion at Ann Arbor. There are differences of opinion in detail; but in most of the abstracts the feeling seems clear that there *is* a large amount of identity in the syntax of the languages most commonly studied, and that, to the extent to which this exists, we ought, in the interests of teaching no less than of science, to employ a uniform grammatical terminology.

The same feeling is likewise shown in a most important way, by the realization of the hope expressed in my paper, that a joint committee on the subject might be established by the leading bodies of this country concerned in the teaching of language; namely, the National Education Asso-

ciation, the Modern Language Association of America, and the American Philological Association. Requests to this effect were sent by the two last-named bodies to the first, and favorably answered, upon motion of Mrs. Ella Flagg Young, at the recent meeting in San Francisco.

I take this opportunity of correcting an error of date in my paper. I had been told by an older member of the Modern Language Association than myself, that its Committee of Fifteen upon the harmonizing of grammatical nomenclature was appointed in 1908. On inquiring of the secretary, I learn that it was appointed at the New Haven meeting, in 1906. This association was thus the first to move in the direction of the study of the nomenclature of a group of languages; for those who in that year were dealing with the question in France had French alone in mind. It is a pity that the imposition of a second task upon this committee postponed the carrying-out of the purpose for which it had been appointed.

Those who followed me at Ann Arbor had the advantage of me. I was forced to go through a vast subject in a very brief compass.<sup>1</sup> They, being furnished with copies in advance, were able to supplement me whenever they wished, as well as to point out where they differed. They have thus, among other things, said much that I should like myself to have said.

The chief point at which I find myself in disagreement with Professor Rounds' article is in his implication that we are likely to disagree—that our points of view “must of necessity be so utterly different.” The impression is one which I should like to dispel. Now I do not know whether Professor Rounds has in mind my active occupation in comparative syntax, or my being a college teacher. On the first head, I should say that the facts of usage upon which comparative syntax is based are the same for any given language as the facts of usage on which a grammar of that language must be based; and that one who, like myself, insists that syntax must be an observational science, will endeavor not to warp these facts. On the second head I should say that I see no greater tendency toward complexity of terminology among college teachers than among teachers in the schools. In the list of grammars compiled by Professor Rounds which I cited in my paper,<sup>2</sup> the terminology of twenty-two English grammars is tabulated for certain of the commonest and simplest constructions of the noun and adjective. The exhibit shows an extraordinary variety of names, and, in many of these, a great lack of simplicity. But the large majority of the authors of these grammars are teachers in schools, and Professor Rounds' perfectly sound contention could have been proved just as well

<sup>1</sup> For a fuller, though still too brief, treatment see my paper in the *Proceedings of the Modern Language Association of America*, Vol. XXVI, No. 2. The concluding part will appear, I hope, within the present academic year.

<sup>2</sup> Published in the *Educational Review*, June, 1910.

from this class as from the whole; while the simpler names which he prefers (and which I equally prefer) can be found in either class. I see no difference between the two in tendency. But it is worth while to point out, on the other hand, that in the grammars of Greek and Latin in common use in this country (all of them being by college men) there is far less difference of terminology than in our grammars of English, and that the terms for four at least of the five constructions embraced in the table are, in all of these Greek and Latin grammars, the ones which I understand Professor Rounds to prefer. As for myself personally, I am aware that I have had the reputation, and justly, of being an innovator and disturber; but I look upon the situation with some amusement, since the fact is that the large majority of my new views and new terms, together with details of arrangement and of style of exposition, have already passed, without mention of their origin, and doubtless in many cases without knowledge of it, into common acceptance in the Latin textbooks not only of college men but of school men. Even people who will not put in their books any references to the Hale-Buck Latin Grammar are yet quite ready to adopt my views, my technical terms, my arrangement, and even my coloring of phrase.

Other views expressed by Professor Rounds from which I differ are the implications that the terminology of English grammar should be considered entirely by itself, and that the report upon it should be entirely finished by February next. An early ending of the present state of things is very desirable; but evils so great and that have so long existed had better be cured effectively in two years than imperfectly cured, for many years to come, in one. Professor Rounds has himself indicated, even in the few points which he could mention in his brief paper, that there is a great deal to be done, and has touched upon matters of real difficulty. I fear that some of the conclusions reached by a committee of busy men, somewhat widely dispersed, and forced to do most of their work by the slow method of correspondence, would have to be precipitate if the whole matter were to be settled in so short a time. I doubt, too, if the knowledge of the rapidity with which the work was done would tend to "harmonize the many discordant voices" of which Professor Kuersteiner justly speaks. We have a great opportunity, and should expend upon it real deliberation.

It is true that we have the report of the English committee. But this report has been attacked in England, and Professor Rounds himself, while alluding to it with general commendation, has shown that he cannot accept it *in toto*. Further points at which I feel sure he will not accept it might be shown. Thus the committee recommends "that the term 'epithet' be used to distinguish adjectives and nouns which are not predicative," and explains in a note that the term "has been preferred to 'attribute' as the description of non-predicative adjectives and nouns in order to avoid confusion with the French term *attribut*, which is used to denote the predicative adjective

or noun in the official French scheme of terminology, where also the term *épithète* is employed as above." The term appears to me to be as bad for French as for English. In both languages, the word "epithet" has acquired a fixed meaning, and this meaning is not the one assigned to it in the French and English reports. The name recommended thus violates one of the sound principles of terminology laid down by Professor Rounds.

It is already clear that the whole matter will ultimately become one of international conference. As I said in my paper, we must not wait for this; but we must be prepared for it, and must be ready to exercise our own influence through having reached well-considered and well-defended conclusions. But all this takes time.

As to another point, I likewise am not disposed, to use Professor Rounds' words, "to strain matters in order to make a nomenclature of an inflected tongue fit the grammar of our uninflected tongue." I can well believe that, for some uses, it will be best *not* to have the same terminology. But every principle of function in English grammar exists in the grammars of every one of the languages taught in our schools (as witness those embraced in Professor Rounds' table), and it is not well that the student should have to employ different names for identical principles as he passes from the study of English to the study of other languages. Professor Rounds cannot afford to neglect our high-school students, all of whom study some language or languages besides their own. Two ways of reaching harmony are possible. By one of these, the nomenclature which shall be adopted by the Committee of Five for English must be adopted bodily for all the other languages: in which case, this small committee will not be, in fact, as it is in name, a committee upon the terminology of English grammar, but a committee upon the terminology of the grammars of all the languages commonly studied in this country. That does not seem to me right, even though I myself, having been made a member of this small committee, shall have a share in this great power. I cannot believe that, if this way were pursued, the many teachers of the other languages, ancient and modern, in our schools, would think their interests to have been fairly considered. The other way is to survey the problem as a whole. Of the two ways, the second seems to me clearly the right one.

I similarly do not feel, as Professor Rounds does, that "our emphasis must come, of course, upon different phases of the problem." It is true that, in my paper, I addressed myself especially to the syntax of the moods, because I believe that there is a great deal of erroneous traditional opinion in this field. But I was careful to say that the treatment of the moods would play a relatively small part in English grammar.

These points apart, I find myself in general in strong accord with Professor Rounds' thinking, and I look forward with pleasure to our work together for the common cause.

Professor Meader, from experience in teaching both modern and ancient languages, agrees as to the evils of the present system. As to his statement that we should try to discover and describe the types of ideas conveyed by constructions, that is of course our common aim. This is precisely what, in my brief paper, I tried to do for the subjunctive and the corresponding modal auxiliaries. As to the method of introspection, and of the use of normal conversation in our own vernacular, I likewise employ it, noticing what I mean by what I say, and frequently asking my interlocutor to tell me just what he meant by something that he has said. But when I wish to lay my results before others, these facts, even if I have noted them down (as I often do, both from conversation and from letters received), will have no more validity than any other printed material of a corresponding class, and might be received with less confidence than the examples of the vernacular which I have cited from President Taft, and Mr. Walter Camp, and the editorials or news reports of our daily papers, and even from careful writers in the ordinary interchange of opinion. To put the matter to immediate test, I recognize that I use the word "should" (besides other uses), now to express the idea of obligation, propriety, or reasonableness, and now to express the idea of natural likelihood or probability; and this has a bearing upon an important problem. I find that others employ the same word in the same way. But when I have occasion to make use of these facts in an address or paper, it would be much more troublesome to quote my personal experiences, and certainly not more effective, than it would be to call attention to the fact that, in his abstract printed above, Professor Meader has himself used the word to express obligation ("We should approach . . . ." and "The material with which we work should be primarily contemporary experience in normal conversation in our own vernacular"), and has used the same word also to express natural likelihood or probability (as in "They should form a thoroughly sound foundation").

In his last paragraph, in the statement, "I have usually been better satisfied with the student who could describe a function than with one who could merely name it," Professor Meader hints at a pedagogic principle commonly overlooked, but of the utmost importance. I hope that this, and other important and little-recognized principles, will be discussed in print in the coming winter, in notable papers which I have seen in manuscript, by Mr. Mason D. Gray, of the East High School, Rochester, N.Y.

Professor Kuersteiner's general support of the position of my paper gives me satisfaction. I can understand, too, how the warning which he utters may occur to any careful thinker. It is conveyed in these words:

A scholar interested in syntax is anxious, of course, to reach generalizations that may be as broad as possible. Now the broader a generalization the more difficult it is to understand. Thus Professor Hale may be right in classifying the subjunctive after verbs of fearing as he does, but it is extremely doubtful whether a high-school pupil could grasp his classification.

And, later, "A multiplicity of small generalizations is better than a few broad ones." I wish that I could speak at length on this text, but I must only answer briefly as follows:

There *is* danger in anxiety to reach broad generalization. We have certain generalizations in current use today which, to my mind, are harmful, not because they are broad, but because they have obliterated clear actual *differences* in the phenomena put together. For myself, I endeavor not to be anxious to reach any particular result, but to *observe*, and to try to detect, first of all, *functions*. What actual function do I find, for example, to be expressed by this particular use of the subjunctive before me, what by this, and what by this? I reach in this way, in most cases—not in all—the same conclusions that others have reached. I find the Latin subjunctive, for example, to be used in the expression of exhortation, of result, of command, of concession of a certain kind, of deliberation, of a condition of a certain kind, of a conclusion of a certain kind, in substantive clauses after verbs of certain kinds and after nouns and adjectives of certain kinds, and so on. In each case, I try to make out precisely what the mood-feeling in the speaker's mind is. It seems to me that, in exhortation, he *wants* others to join with him in doing that which the verb denotes; in prohibition (in which, of course, there is a negative particle), that he *wants* the person addressed *not* to do that which the verb denotes; in command, that he *wants* the act denoted to be performed. I really find, then, not three different attitudes of mind in the three constructions, but *one* attitude of mind, the difference being wholly one of the person, or of the presence or absence of a negative. Here is a generalization; but it is easy, and is helpful. In showing the force in question to my pupils or to my readers, I use the homely word "want," as well as the less homely word "will." To get a technical name for the attitude of mind, I am brought to make the term "subjunctive of volition" (which is by no means bad), since "subjunctive of willing" or "subjunctive of wanting" seems unsatisfactory. I also make the word "volitive," in order to have an adjective at hand, in the interests of brevity in classroom work. Now I have shown elsewhere that the Latin clause of purpose is pretty surely of volitive origin *and feeling*, corresponding to the English occasional *shall*-clause of purpose, of which I gave an example from ex-President Roosevelt. I therefore put the Latin clause of purpose into the chapter headed "Uses of the Volitive Subjunctive." This generalization does not add to the child's task: it *lessens* his task. Again I find reason to believe that the Latin clause of fear, from which the French clause of fear is derived, began in a combination of an expression of anxiety and an independent expression of the idea that the speaker *wants* something to happen (volitive) or wants something *not* to happen (volitive with a negative<sup>3</sup>), as I said in the longer form of my paper sent out in advance

<sup>3</sup> My predecessors had either explained the use of *ut* and *ne* mechanically, or had treated it as a development from the idea of *wishing*. The difference between this last explanation and mine is of course not large; but it is as well to be right as to be nearly right.

to those who were to follow me at Ann Arbor. I therefore put the construction under the general head of the volitive in the syntax of the Hale-Buck Grammar. I have received letters from several high-school teachers telling me that it was a relief to them to be able now to explain, intelligibly to their pupils, this apparently self-contradictory construction, which they had hitherto had to explain in ways that neither they nor the class understood. This is the explanation of which Professor Kuersteiner says that it is extremely doubtful whether a high-school pupil could grasp my classification. But there is better evidence even than this. In the Hale *Latin Prose Composition, Book I, Based on Caesar*, the rule is given as follows:

Fear is expressed by a subjunctive clause with *ne*, representing the act as *not wanted*, or with *ut*, representing it as *wanted*. English uses "lest" or "that" where Latin uses *ne*, and "lest not" or "that not" where Latin uses *ut*.

A note, intended to remove a common<sup>4</sup> and, to the student, most confusing impression, adds:

Bear in mind that English and Latin get at the expression of the idea from entirely different points of view. *Ne*, of course, does not *mean* "that," and *ut* does not *mean* "that not." We are simply forced to translate according to our own idiom.

This use of the homely and easily intelligible word "want" to describe the attitude of mind was, by the way, new in print. Now Professor B. L. D'Ooge of the State Normal College at Ypsilanti, Mich., a practised teacher and teacher of teachers, and author of various textbooks, says in his recent *Latin for Beginners*, § 370:

We have learned that what we want done or not done is expressed in Latin by a subjunctive clause of purpose. In this class belongs also clauses after verbs of fearing, for we fear either that something will happen or that it will not, and we either want it to happen or we do not. If we want a thing to happen and fear that it will not, the purpose<sup>5</sup> clause is introduced by *ut*. If we do not want it to happen, and fear that it will, *ne* is used. Owing to a difference between the English and Latin idiom we translate *ut* after a verb of fearing by "that not" and *ne* by "that" or "lest."

I must conclude, then, that my classification and my form of statement of the construction (including the use of the word "want") seems to Professor D'Ooge to promise to be more easily, not less easily, understood in the schools than those of my predecessors. See also what is said later about the treatment of the ablative of the agent with *a* or *ab*.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. the statement in Professor Bennett's *Latin Grammar*, § 296, under the heading "Substantive Clauses Developed from the Optative:" "Here belong clauses . . . with verbs of fearing (*timeo, metuo, vereor*). Here *ne* means 'that,' 'lest,' and *ut* means 'that not.'"

<sup>5</sup> I do not like this phrase. The clause never was a clause of purpose. But this way of representing it belongs to the nomenclature of Professor Greenough's school of syntax, to which Professor D'Ooge is in the main attached.



I also differ from Professor Kuersteiner at the following sentences:

The desire on the part of teachers and textbook-makers to make instruction in Latin an exercise in classification has been the bane of our high-school work. It has also been and is the refuge of the teacher who does not know enough of the language to lead pupils on to a ready understanding of the foreign text. Of course, the harder the generalization is for the pupil, the more time the incompetent teacher can devote to it.

The fact, in general, seems to me to be the opposite. It is not the broader generalizations, which would give a sense of unity, that the teacher spends time upon: it is the narrower generalizations—exhortation, clause of purpose, clause after a verb of commanding, etc.—on which time is spent, as indeed it must be, until the student quickly recognizes the forces of these common constructions. But the very defect of this teaching, which is the result of the conceptions and form of exposition of the textbooks, lies in the fact that these constructions are all looked upon as utterly separate and unrelated things, instead of being looked upon and presented as merely uses to which a few easily recognized forces of the subjunctive are put. Thus in my experience students, and, in my teachers' training courses, teachers, are both helped and interested when it is shown them that the subjunctive, in the force in which it expresses what someone *wants*, is used to convey the ideas of exhortation, command, prohibition, purpose, and in clauses depending upon verbs, nouns, or adjectives involving the idea of wanting; and that in an *imaginative* sense, it is also used, just like the English imperative or the infinitive with "let" (thus: "I am well aware that I am the umblest person going," said Uriah Heep, modestly, 'let the other be where he may,' " Dickens, *David Copperfield*, Chap. xvi), in expressing the ideas of concession and of proviso, and sometimes in expressing a condition in independent form. Not only this, but the student actually *learns* the construction at the beginning more readily and easily if he is told this, and shown that the same uses of the same force are more or less familiar in English. Similarly, he learns the construction of the ablative absolute the more easily if he is told (as can be proved) that the construction is, in origin, only one use of the *with*-power of the ablative, with which he is by this time well acquainted, and that, if he will watch what he hears and reads in English, he will find abundant illustrations of the same thing, as in "with telephone and telegraph service crippled and more than 300 miles of railroad out of commission only meager reports are being received from the flood-swept districts," from the *Chicago Evening Post*, October 10.

But I must add that one cause of the ineffectiveness of the teaching of syntax in our schools is the fact that a considerable number of the "narrower generalizations" about common constructions are not sound, and the student is therefore obliged to give names of which he certainly ought not to see the application. Such things lead to purely mechanical conceptions of

the nature of syntax. The teacher, too, has to force his explanation, and change it if he changes his series of textbooks. Thus if he uses Bennett's *Caesar*, he must explain *quare timeret* in I, xiv as "a clause of purpose"; if the Allen & Greenough *Caesar*, as "a clause of characteristic"; if the Harkness-Forbes *Caesar*, as "a potential subjunctive in a relative clause"; if the Towles-Jenks *Caesar* as a "clause of purpose"; while the exactly corresponding *quare animadverteret* of I, xix has to be explained by users of the last-named book as an "indirect question."<sup>8</sup> And all these two thousand years, Caesar himself has been ready to teach anyone, who will observe, that *his* meaning was that of obligation or propriety; for he has balanced against *quare timeret* the form *timendum*, which can have no other meaning! It isn't too much science that makes the teaching of syntax hard in our schools: it is too much *blind* and *false* "science."

With regard to the results of Professor Wagner's questions put to his students in Spanish, my explanation would be as follows:

I did not mean that "every additional language he [the student] learns adds to his confusion" no matter whether he is forced to learn different explanations for identical conceptions or not.

A good many teachers, fortunately, make little use of the theories of inter-relationship which most of the books contain. The student's unconscious linguistic feeling grows with the extension of his range of languages. Left to himself as to theories, he will not be confused by things which are alike, but quite the contrary. By the time he reaches the comparatively advanced stages at which the study of Spanish is ordinarily taken up, he has very probably even forgotten the "generalizations" which he may perhaps have been forced to learn some years before for other languages. But if, on the other hand, the student is obliged to learn and keep up generalizations for the languages which he studies, I am certain that Professor Wagner must agree with me that it is harder to learn, for identical conceptions, a different explanation for each language, than to learn one explanation for all; and this is what the experience of the four students he mentions points to. But I should have to differ from him as to the proportion of grammars and other manuals that make the general explanations of which I spoke in my paper.

From Professor Scott's very admirably expressed description of the probable earlier stages of language, I do not differ essentially, as he himself has intimated. And I like very much his statement that "the aim of a vernacular grammar is to rationalize for the student something that he already knows," as likewise the image which he employs, of a map of the

<sup>8</sup> For a brief exhibit, without comment, of these discordances, as well as of agreements, see in the *Hale Latin Prose Composition* the appendix for the teacher entitled "Correspondences and Differences in Terminology and Treatment in the Five Grammars Cited and the Editions of *Caesar* in Common Use."

town or township in which the student lives. The whole paragraph upon this head is most instructive and helpful.

It is true also that when the student approaches a foreign language he has *everything* to learn. But I believe, at the same time, that we may teach foreign languages in such a way that the student will not have to "take everything on trust," but may be led to observe, and to see for himself that the statements made conform to *his* observation, if they are true. The process is not, to be sure, a rationalization of that which he already knows; but the result in his consciousness, if the work is done in this way, and is sound, will equally be a rational system, precisely as it is in the study of physics, in which the student is always carried far beyond that which he knew at the outset. Thus if a high-school boy has a substantive *ut*-clause depending upon *volo* ("I want") put before him, he can easily see that the *ut*-clause expresses that which is wanted; in other words, that the attitude of mind is that which I have called "volitive." Similarly, if he is shown a substantive *ut*-clause depending upon *exspecto* ("I expect," "I wait for"), he will easily see that the attitude of expectation, of anticipation, or whatever we find it on the whole best to call it, is in the mood of the dependent clause as well as in the inherent meaning of the main verb. Moreover, as I have said, actual study has brought me to believe—what is in itself also antecedently extremely probable—that the grammatical ideas which we ourselves are constantly hearing and expressing in the vernacular are not ideas of English-speaking people alone, but are ideas which people have in France, in Germany, in Italy, in Spain, and which people had in Rome when Latin was spoken, and in Greece when ancient Greek was spoken. Even if the methods of expressing these ideas are different in these different countries, the ideas are in the main the same, or, at any rate, essentially the same, and the names for them should, therefore, be the same in the respective grammars. Even so much should be a great gain. But actual study has also brought me to believe that, to a very considerable extent, the methods of *expression* of these ideas are actually identical in the various languages; that, in a word, the human mind has worked largely *in the same way* in the different branches of our great blood-family. And even the deflections from what appear to be the ways of the common inheritance seem to me to show in most cases a remarkable amount of similarity. I hope accordingly for a treatment of grammars which will inculcate the same conceptions, by the use of the same names and the same explanations, for all these languages, so far as things are the same, and will use different explanations and different names to the extent only to which things are different. Such a treatment will not in the least tend to obscure the actually existing dissimilarities: it will tend to bring them into stronger relief.

And, finally, so far as regards this particular matter, I am now convinced

that, in the study of a foreign language, we should start with the corresponding phenomena of English, so far as there is correspondence.<sup>7</sup> I have always made much of English syntax in my syntactical seminary, and in my training courses for teachers. I have done so to some extent in my Latin books for school use, but, momentarily deterred by the difficulty of space, I have not done it as much as I shall do it in the revision of them. To illustrate: In the syntax of the Hale-Buck Grammar, in treating of the Latin expression of the idea of the agent by the ablative with *a* or *ab*, I compared "There was a man sent from God," John 1:6, and in my *First Latin Book* I compared "an arrow shot from a well-experienced archer," after making the statement "The meaning (of the Latin construction) was originally *from*, the conception being that of the person from whom the action started." Professor D'Ooge, in the book mentioned above, finds it profitable to work my phrase into his "rule," which reads (§181) "the word expressing the person from whom an action starts, when not the subject, is put in the ablative with the preposition *a* or *ab*." This is well; but I think the users of his book would grasp the idea still more easily and surely if he had given them an English example of the same conception, though this is one of the places where the *ordinary* English conception does not correspond with the Latin one. In treating the Latin subjunctive, I did not begin in my books with the English subjunctive, but I shall do so in revisions. Thus such an expression as "Everybody watch his man," which I overheard yesterday from a captain on the football field, such sentences as Walter Camp's "It is essential that the West and the East be in sympathy," the *Boston Advertiser's* "The government asked that this organization be dissolved," and Longfellow's "But to act that each tomorrow find us further than today," would form a helpful, as well as scientifically sound, introduction to the treatment of the Latin subjunctive.

Of course, many of the things which the grammars of foreign languages have to treat are not treated in elementary English grammars at all, and should not be. The student does not need to be told them in order to understand what he reads, and has enough to do in mastering the first principles, without them. But when these necessary things are taken up in the study of other languages, the starting-point for the conveying of the ideas should, so far as possible, be in the vernacular.

With the principle laid down by Professor Scott for the choice of grammatical terms I am fully in sympathy. Nor is there any real difference between us with regard to metaphysical theories in grammar. I believe that the ultimate system of metaphysics and the ultimate system of grammar must, of course, be in harmony. But I am sure that neither of us believes that the way to make a grammar now is to adopt the system of some metaphysician—Aristotle, or Descartes, or Wolff, or Kant, or Hegel—and endeavor to cast the constructions which we find into its mold.

<sup>7</sup> On this point also, see the expected papers by Mr. Gray.

Professor Diekhoff's paper contains, besides its courteous opening, much interesting critical matter, which I should gladly discuss. But a part of the discussion, and that the most important part, namely, with regard to the use of the Germanic optative after words meaning *before* and *until*, would require a detailed treatment of a large number of examples, and demand much more space than would be reasonable here. The present paper has also doubtless reached the limit of patience of the readers of the symposium. I must therefore reserve the discussion for some technical journal, touching here upon only three points.

First, I have repeatedly said that I am ready for any conclusion, being as anxious to recognize the differences among languages as I am to recognize the identities; though the evidence, so far as I know it, does not bring me to agree with Professor Diekhoff.

Second, the general method of Professor Diekhoff's procedure in the examination of the Germanic optative with words meaning *before* or *until* is sound, and the results, upon his exhibition of the facts, seem weighty. In the time at my command, I can control the evidence from Gothic only. Here, I do not find the facts to be exactly reported. When he says that "*faurthizei*, 'before,' a comparative form, is the only one of all the temporal conjunctions followed by the subjunctive," he doubtless means "the only one that is *always* followed by the subjunctive"; and this is true. But the next statement is too strong. It reads: "*und thatei*, 'until,' 'as long as,' is usually, and *unte*, with the same meaning . . . is almost in every case followed by the indicative." Now I find six cases of *und thatei*, four in the indicative and two in the subjunctive. For *unte* I find twenty-two cases, sixteen in the indicative and six in the subjunctive. But certain subtractions have also to be made from the indicative examples for types which under *no* theory could be in any other mood (as, e.g., in "followed him . . . until he came to the palace of the high priest," and "I must work . . . while it is day"). With these removed, we have the following proportions: for *und thatei*, two indicatives and two subjunctives; for *unte*, twelve indicatives and six subjunctives.

The nine examples with *faurthizei*, "before," are all in the subjunctive. An individual examination of them reduces the number that have a bearing. But I waive this point for the present; and I also grant that, in Old and Middle High and Low German, the mood-usage seems, as the special treatises say, to be approximately the same in "before" clauses and clauses after a comparative. Yet all the while the striking fact confronts us, that our earliest surviving Germanic monument, Gothic, in spite of its short compass, actually possesses twelve examples, in *independent sentences*, of that very force, the anticipatory, which I invoke to explain the origin of the subjunctive clauses with "before" and "until" (particles which by their very nature seem adapted to set up the idea of futurity), and to explain the force

of the mood in the occasional modern use. But it is quite possible that the peculiar Germanic habit of using a subjunctive after a comparative, after it had once arisen, may for a while have helped to keep the mood steady, or even have brought about a different feeling for it. That habit, which looks like a highly derivative one, was pretty surely *not* of early origin, and certainly does not exist in modern Germanic. On the other hand, Professor Diekhoff's explanation of the subjunctive after *bis*, *bevor*, and *ehe* in the modern period as expressing an act wished for would fail for the majority of cases, for example, for Luther's "der Hahn wird nicht krähen, bis du mich drei Mal habest verleugnet" (John 13:38).

Finally, I wish to disclaim Professor Diekhoff's apparent opinion that Brugmann's system and mine are substantially the same. Brugmann himself has expressly said at one point that they are not;<sup>8</sup> and still more important ones remain. There are essential differences both in the broad lines and in method. A typical example of the latter sort may be seen in the printed abstract of a paper which I gave before the *Versammlung deutscher Professoren und Schulmänner* in Basel, in 1907, and in which I dealt also with the method of Delbrück and Behaghel in the same field. For the former, it is my misfortune that, for the cases as well as for the moods, I have had time to set forth long-held views only in very brief and inadequate form, as in abstracts entitled "Leading Mood-Forces in the Indo-European Parent Speech," and "Leading Case-Forces in the Indo-European Parent Speech," in the *Proceedings of the American Philological Association*, Vol. XXXII, 1901.

<sup>8</sup> *Griech. Grammatik*, § 554, Anmerkung: "Die Ausdrücke *volitiv* und *prospektiv* sind von Hale, 'The Anticipatory Subjunctive in Greek and Latin,' *Stud. Class. Phil.* Chicago 1, S. 6 gebraucht, welcher für *prospektiv* auch *anticipatorisch* sagt. Den *deliberativen* Gebrauch halte ich gegen Hale als besondere Kategorie aufrecht, weil er als Negation *μή* hatte. Dass er im Grunde mit der *futurischen* (*prospektiven*) Verwendung identisch gewesen sein *kann*, leugne ich natürlich nicht." I do not find the origin of the ordinary deliberative subjunctive in the anticipatory use, but in the volitive, for which the negative is *μή*, as it is *not* for the anticipatory. The deliberative is simply a volitive question (compare *μή ἴωμεν*, "let us not go," and *μή ἴωμεν* "shall we not go?") And I see no more reason for making the interrogative form of the volitive a distinct category than for making the interrogative form of the indicative a distinct kind of indicative.